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The primary purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between
bank capital and credit risk taking in emerging market economies. We also
investigate the inﬂuence of several regulatory, institutional and legal features
on the relationship between risk and capital. We apply a simultaneous equa-
tions framework following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Jacques and Nigro
(1997). Our results corroborate the existing ﬁndings for US and other indus-
trial economies, putting forward the impact of capital regulation on banks’
behavior. We also show empirical evidence on the role of the regulatory,
institutional and legal environment in driving bank capitalization and credit
risk taking behavior in emerging market economies.
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1 Introduction and literature survey
Bank capital regulation is usually explained in the literature by the negative
externalities of bank default (Berger, Herring, and Szeg¨ o 1995, Benston 2000,
Santos 2001). Bank default generates important costs : ﬁnancial losses for
the stakeholders (shareholders, clients, deposits insurance fund), loss of com-
petitiveness, and a potential destabilization of the ﬁnancial system, through
the contagion mechanisms, when several individual failures lead to a banking
crisis. The resolution of these failures is a waste of resources, particularly
scarce in emerging market economies (EME) (Honohan 1997)1. Bank regu-
lation aims mainly at limiting the exposure of the bank deposits insurer, and
the banker’s excessive risk taking incentives and therefore bank default risk.
The Basel Committee from the Bank for International Settlements pro-
posed an Accord on bank capital minimum levels - the so-called Basel I
Accord. It aimed at implementing regulatory requirements in terms of bank
capital through the Cooke Ratio. The main aim of Basel I was to promote
and achieve international convergence of standard minimum capital require-
ments. This was done by creating a level playing ﬁeld among banks by
raising capital ratios and promoting ﬁnancial stability by adopting simple
approach to credit risk. The primary purpose of the risk-based standards
was to make bank capital requirements more sensitive and responsive to the
bank’s portfolio risk.
In recent years, a number of both theoretical and empirical studies have
examined the impact of regulatory capital standards on bank portfolio risk.
Using the mean-variance framework, Kahane (1977), Koehn and San-
tomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) have shown that increased
regulatory capital standards may have the opposite eﬀect, causing bankers
to increase their portfolio risk. In such framework, changes in capital and
portfolio risk would be positively correlated. Blum (1999) comes to similar
conclusions in a dynamic framework, proving the existence of an intertempo-
ral eﬀect of capital regulation, which may push an under-capitalized bank to
increase risk in period t in order to meet regulatory requirements in period
1For example, the banking crisis in Indonesia (1997) and Thailand (1997-98) costed
about 50-55% and 42.3% of the GDP respectively in term of restructurization (ﬁscal con-
tribution).
1t+1. Rochet (1992) uses the portfolio approach with bank’s limited liability
to show that insuﬃciently capitalized banks may exhibit risk-loving behavior,
even if regulation makes uses of risk-related capital ratio.
Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) have argued
that the mean-variance framework is inappropriate in the banking context
because it ignores the option value of deposit insurance. Using a contingent-
claims model, these authors show that increased capital standards won’t push
banks to increase their portfolio risk, because an increase in capital reduces
the value of the option, reducing incentives for excessive risk taking.
More recently, Jeitschko and Jeung (2004) propose a uniﬁed approach
to investigate the relationship between bank’s capitalization and risk-taking
behavior in a model which incorporates the incentives of the deposit insurer,
the shareholder and the manager. Their results show that bank’s risk can
either decrease or increase with capitalization depending on the relative forces
of these three agents.
1.1 The Basel I mechanism
The Basel I Accord focus on credit risk, which can be deﬁned as the risk of
loss due to borrower or counterparty default. The key to the Accord is the
obligation for banks to continually meet two capital adequacy ratios : Tier
1 and total capital ratios. Both ratios have the same denominator which
is a risk-weighted sum of the bank’s on- and oﬀ- balance sheet activities.
A simpliﬁed formula for the risk-weighted assets (RWA) may be RWA = P4
i=1αiAi, with αi corresponding to the weight by risk category and Ai the
volume of assets by category2.
The Tier 1 ratio’s numerator consists of the “core capital” which is the
stakeholder equity capital and disclosed reserves. The total capital ratio’s nu-
merator consists of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, the latter being the“supplemen-
tary capital” including elements like undisclosed reserves and subordinated
debt.
Basel I requires banks to have a Tier 1 ratio of at least 4% and a total
capital ratio of at least 8% (with the contribution of Tier 2 not exceeding
50%). Banks that wish to meet the regulatory requirements can use mainly
three types of balance-sheet adjustments : increase the capital level, decrease
the risk-weighted assets as a proportion of total assets and / or decrease the
2The four risk categories are : zero default risk assets (e.g. cash, government bonds
/ securities) - weight of 0%, low rate default risk (e.g. loans to OECD banks) - weight
of 20%, medium risk assets (e.g. residential mortgage loans) - weight 50% and remaining
assets - weight 100%.
2total assets3.
1.2 Capital regulation and risk taking in EME
The relationship between capital and risk in the banking industry of emerging
market economies has received less attention than in United States (e.g.
Shrieves and Dahl 1992, Jacques and Nigro 1997), in Europe (e.g. Rime
2001, Ediz, Michael, and Perraudin 1998), or even in an international context
(VanRoy 2003). However, this issue is particularly relevant in these countries.
These previous studies usually show that undercapitalized banks increase
their capital adequacy ratios, result being consistent with the idea that reg-
ulatory pressure is eﬀective and banks will maintain ratios above minimum
requirements for precautionary and/or reputational reasons. There is much
less consensus on whether banks (under or over capitalized) engaged in riskier
activities. Changes in capital ratios and credit risk appear to be rather un-
related.
As well as the banking sector in developed countries, banks in emerging
markets have also got through several waves of change, particularly within
technological and regulatory areas. Banking crisis and the privatization pro-
cess remain features which are speciﬁc to the emerging markets. Their bank-
ing industries remained highly regulated and protected for a long time, es-
pecially through rates and market entry regulation. During the 90’s, the
deregulation started, allowing foreign investors to entry into the market.
Among the main banking crisis factors which can be found in the litera-
ture (excessive loans growth, inadequate exchange rate regime, ﬁnancial lib-
eralization ...) (see Goldstein and Turner 1996, Caprio and Klingebiel 1996),
an inadequate regulatory and supervisory regime and a weak legal and in-
stitutional framework are the most important (Bell and Pain 2000, Rojas-
Suarez 2000, Rojas-Suarez 2001).
The banking industry remains regulated, and through substitution, its
mechanisms may alter other disciplining mechanisms, like market or corpo-
rate governance. Capital regulation represents a costly mechanism and may
be less eﬃcient as a disciplining device, as bureaucratic and political prob-
3The Basel I Accord has several limitations, mainly the lack of sensitivity of the risk-
weights to the eﬀective asset’s risk and simpliﬁed risk classiﬁcation, leaving room for
capital arbitrage. This mainly consists of shifting balance sheet positions (e.g. ﬁnancial
innovation allows to use oﬀ-balance sheet products like derivatives) from high to low risk
categories in order to economize capital. Since 1999 a new Accord - Basel II Reform -
is being elaborated in order to tackle these limitations, which should be implemented by
2006. This Reform and its implications for the banking industry is beyond the scope of
this paper.
3lems are usually present. Emerging markets usually have under-developed
ﬁnancial markets, accrued opacity within the banking industry which is also
fragile and banks exhibit important volume of non performing loans (NPL),
and sometimes inadequate regulatory, institutional and legal environment
(Rojas-Suarez 2000, Rojas-Suarez 2001, Godlewski 2004).
Rojas-Suarez puts forward the main emerging markets’ problem concern-
ing capital regulation eﬃciency : lack of data and of accounting standards
and rules, bad reporting systems, and ineﬃcient ﬁnancial markets. During
the 90’s, periods of ﬁnancial crisis in emerging markets where correlated with
bank capital growth. In the same time, banks usually preferred to hold pub-
lic bonds instead of issuing loans, generating credit crunches, without any
guarantee of bond’s quality (compared to the agency rating of such issues),
as the issuers where emerging states. Another problem was the regulation’s
impact on foreign capital volatility, as interbank loans weight was extremely
low, and fostered its ﬂow to emerging market economies.
The investigation into the relationship between bank regulation, bank
strength and proﬁtability and the legal, institutional and regulatory environ-
ment show mixed evidence. Usually, the main driving force for bank stabil-
ity is the market discipline (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 1999, Barth, Caprio,
and Levine 2000, Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2001), which is rather weak in
EME and inﬂuenced by bank regulation. Legal, institutional, regulatory and
supervisory devices usually inﬂuence and even alter other mechanisms like
corporate governance, deepening for example the Asian Crisis (Hussain and
Wihlborg 1999, Klapper and Love 2002, Mitton 2002).
Finally, because of its speciﬁc features, like short maturity debt and less
diversiﬁcation and funding opportunities (Allen and Gale 2000), and due to
the global ﬁnancial integration, any banking problems in emerging markets
can spread to banking sectors from other countries, even developed.
Therefore, this study is motivated by several elements, and proposes their
empirical investigation : lack of empirical evidence concerning the impact of
capital regulation on bank risk taking in EME, as well as concerning the
relationship between these capital and risk, and lack of empirical evidence
on the inﬂuence of various legal, institutional and regulatory features on this
relationship.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
methodology and the data used in this study. Results and their discussion
are provided in section 3. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper and gives
several future research perspectives.
42 Methodology and data
2.1 Methodology
We follow the methodology proposed ﬁrst by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and
further extended by Jacques and Nigro (1997). Is is a simultaneous equa-
tions framework, where capital and risk decisions are supposed to be taken
simultaneously, and where risk-based capital standards may have an impact
on both capital and risk.
Observed changes in bank capital and risk levels are decomposed into two
components : a discretionary adjustment and a change caused by exogenous
factors.
∆CAPj,t = ∆
dCAPj,t + Ej,t, (1)
∆RISKj,t = ∆
dRISKj,t + Fj,t, (2)
where ∆CAPj,t and ∆RISKj,t are the observed changes in capital and
risk levels, respectively, in bank j for period t, and ∆dCAPj,t and ∆dRISKj,t
represent discretionary adjustments in capital and risk. Ej,t and Fj,t are
exogenously determined factors.
Under the hypothesis that banks may not be able to adjust their cap-
ital and risk levels instantaneously, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) modeled the








j,t − RISKj,t−1), (4)
where CAP ∗
j,t and RISK∗
j,t are bank’s j target levels of capital and risk. In
this framework, the discretionary changes are proportional to the diﬀerence
between the target and the existing levels in period t − 1 level.
After substituting the equations from (3) into (1), we obtain
∆CAPj,t = α(CAP
∗
j,t − CAPj,t−1) + Ej,t, (5)
∆RISKj,t = β(RISK
∗
j,t − RISKj,t−1) + Fj,t. (6)
The observed changes in capital and risk are a function of their target
levels, their lagged value levels and a set of exogenous factors.
In this study, the target capital ratio CAP ∗ is proxied by the ratio of
EQUITY / TOTAL ASSETS and denoted EQTA, and RISK∗ is proxied by
5the ratio of NON PERFORMING LOANS / TOTAL LOANS and denoted
RISK. These proxies allow to focus exclusively on credit risk, which remains
the principal source of risk for banks.
In equation (5), CAP ∗ is inﬂuenced by a number of explanatory variables
which are the bank’s size (SIZE=log(TOTAL ASSETS)), changes in RISK
(∆dRISKj,t), lag of the capital level (CAPj,t−1), the return on average assets
(ROAA), and a dummy variable (MINCAR(CC)) if the bank’s capital asset
ratio (CAR) is below the country’s minimum regulatory requirement, in order
to control for the regulatory pressure and to investigate its impact on bank’s
behavior. This single regulatory pressure variable emphasizes one aspect :
the level below which a bank should be regarded as undercapitalized and
hence inﬂuenced by capital adequacy rules.
Following Jacques and Nigro (1997), we investigate the regulatory pres-
sure more deeply, including two new dummies instead of MINCAR(CC),
which are equal to 1
CAP − 1
MINCAR(CC) if bank’s CAR is strictly below the min-
imum CAR (CARLOW, otherwise CARLOW=0), and equal to 1
MINCAR(CC)−
1
CAP otherwise (CARHIGH, otherwise CARHIGH=0). This allows to take
into account the regulatory pressure in a “symmetric” way, as under and
over capitalized banks should exhibit diﬀerent behavior. We also include
another proxy variable for proﬁtability which is the net income (NETINC).
Thus, through these double regulatory pressure variables, a second aspect
of regulatory pressure may be investigated : the size of the gap between a
bank’s capital ratio and its level, hence the magnitude of regulatory pressure
experienced by the bank. The use of these two regulatory pressure’s vari-
ables recognizes the nonlinear relationship between the regulatory capital
standards and either changes in credit risk or capital ratios.
Concerning RISK∗ in equation (6), the same explanatory variables are
used as in equation (5), except that we introduce changes in CAP (∆dCAPj,t)
and the lag of the risk level (RISKj,t−1) instead.
In addition to these exogenous factors, we introduce several regulatory,
institutional and legal factors (ENVFACTORS) in the regressions in order to
investigate their impact on bank’s capital and risk levels. We use several data
sources, mainly Barth et al. (2001), LaPorta et al. (1997), Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt
and Sobaci (2001) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers Transparency Project 2001
databases, and also the Bankscope database, which contents are presented
in the next subsection.
Specifying variables to explain changes in capital and risk, we can rewrite
the equations system (5, 6) as follows4
4We also include geographical area and time dummies. εj,t, µj,t, ηj,t and νj,t are white
noises.








+ γ6ENV FACTORSj,t + εj,t, (7)








+ θ6ENV FACTORSj,t + µj,t. (8)
The equations’ system for the extension following Jacques and Nigro
(1997) may be rewritten as
DEQTAj,t = λ0 + λ1SIZEj,t + λ2ROAAj,t + λ3NETINCj,t + λ4DRISKj,t








+ λ8ENV FACTORSj,t + ηj,t, (9)
DRISKj,t = φ0 + φ1SIZEj,t + φ2ROAAj,t + φ3NETINCj,t + φ4DEQTAj,t








+ φ8ENV FACTORSj,t + νj,t. (10)
2.2 Data
The data used in this study was extracted from the Bankscope database for
the 1996-2001 period and for 30 emerging market economies from three major
geographic areas of Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, and South America.
Bankscope provides balance sheet data in thousand of USD, as well as the
nationality of the bank’s ﬁrst holding.
In order to clean up the data and get a relatively homogenous sample
of banks, we have bounded the variables EQTAj,t and RISKj,t bilaterally
at 1% (−32.13 and 74.74, and 0 and 129.27 respectively), and the variables
EQTAj,t−1 and RISKj,t−1 unilaterally at 1% (−9.4 and 0 respectively). We
have also excluded small banks, which size (TOTAL ASSETS) was less than
the ﬁrst percentile, equal to 47.181 MUSD. This leads to an initial pooled
sample of 2779 banks.
7A major part of the banks in our sample comes from the Latin America
area (42.09%), followed by banks from East Asia and Paciﬁc (24.54%) and
South Asia (above 17.5%). Banks form Eastern Europe and Central Asia
form the residual part of our sample (15.06%). Most of the data in our
sample comes from the 1999 (19.16%), 2000 (22.83%) and 2001 (24.72%)
years, the period from 1996-1998 being residual (less than 15% per year).
Table 1: Main variables descriptive statistics
Variables N mean std.dev. med.
CAR ≥ MINCAR8
RISK 1722 10.65 14.15 6.11
EQTA 1722 14.15 7.28 11.89
L(RISK) 1722 12.42 71.56 5.69
L(EQTA) 1722 13.99 8.15 11.75
DRISK 1722 -1.78 70.94 0.10
DEQTA 1722 0.16 5.46 0.04
ROAA 1722 1.32 4.31 1.32
SIZE 1722 13.36 1.62 13.14
CAR < MINCAR8
RISK 1057 12.11 14.49 7.46
EQTA 1057 5.29 2.42 5.64
L(RISK) 1057 11.04 12.85 7.17
L(EQTA) 1057 6.47 4.39 6.06
DRISK 1057 1.07 12.26 0.05
DEQTA 1057 -1.18 4.51 -0.26
ROAA 1057 0.15 2.59 0.57
SIZE 1057 14.38 1.71 14.39
N.: number of observations, std.dev.: standard
deviation, med.: median. Source : Bankscope.
From the descriptive statistics in table 1, we can see ﬁrst that the means
and medians for the RISK and L(RISK) variables are similar despite being
under or above the minimum CAR. The conclusions are diﬀerent concerning
the EQTA variable, with means and medians at 14.15 and 11.89 for banks
above minimum CAR, and 5.29 and 5.64 for banks being below. We can
put these results in parallel to the statistics of the evolution of the RISK
and EQTA variables : the means and medians of DRISK are −1.78 and 0.1
for above minimum CAR banks and 1.07 and 0.05 for below minimum CAR
8banks, while these statistics for DEQTA are respectively 0.16 and 0.04 for
well capitalized banks and −1.18 and −0.26 for undercapitalized banks.
From these results, we can conclude that undercapitalized banks in our
sample had already lower capital ratios in the past while having a similar
amount of credit risk in their assets compared to well capitalized banks.
These banks show a negative evolution of their credit risk with a positive
evolution of their capital, while undercapitalized banks show a inverse ten-
dency, with positive evolution in risk and negative in capital. This suggests
that such type of capital regulation may not be binding in emerging market
economics, or it may have an adverse eﬀect, inﬂuencing the banks to take
excessive risks in order to meet the regulatory requirements. A gambling for
resurrection behavior may also explain these statistics, as undercapitalized
banks seem to have been in such a position in the past, and having“nothing
to loose”, they engaged in heavy risks in order to generate income in order
to recapitalized themselves through reserves (although the mean and median
values of ROAA are inferior for these banks compared to well capitalized),
as external capital raising remains diﬃcult in emerging markets, with under-
developed and ineﬃcient ﬁnancial markets.
The mean value of the minimum CAR is 8.51%, with a majority of banks
having a CAR requirement of 8% (51.9% of the sample), with 34.27% of
banks having a CAR requirement above (for example : 10% CAR for 17.69%
of the sample, and even 12% CAR for 4.77%).
Finally, regulatory, institutional and legal factors have been builded from
several databases from Barth et al. (2001), LaPorta et al. (1997), Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt and Sobaci (2001) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers Transparency Project
2001. These environmental factors (ENVFACTORS) are introduced into
the regressions in order to investigate their impact on capital and risk ad-
justments in emerging market economies. These variables proxy several di-
mensions of regulation, legal enforcement and institutional quality. Their
selection has been made upon existing literature contributions and statis-
tical signiﬁcance, through stepwise regressions. Table 2 summarizes their
notation, signiﬁcance, and main statistics.
3 Results and discussion
3.1 Single regulatory pressure variable results
We ﬁrst present the regression results for the equations system (7, 8), using
both 2SLS and 3SLS techniques. The latter recognizes the endogeneity of
both bank capital ratios and credit risk levels in a simultaneous equations
9Table 2: Description of the environmental variables
Variables Signiﬁcation Statistics
COVRATIO Bank deposit insurance coverage ratio m.: 3.35 (1.64)
PERSLIM =1 if a personal limit exists freq.: 82.31%
GOVBKFUND =1 if the deposit insurance scheme is cofunded by the government freq.: 25.4%
and the banks
PRIVCREDREG =1 if a private credit registry exists in the country freq.: 61.62%
RISKDISCPUB =1 if banks must disclose risk management procedures to public freq.: 38.57%
DENAPPFOR Number of denied foreign applications for a banking licence m.: 3.45 (4.73)
DEPINSDEC =1 if the deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene a bank freq.: 12.89%
LEGACTION =1 if legal action against external auditors can be taken by supervisors freq.: 55.14%
for negligence
NBSUPERV Number of professional supervisors per bank m.: 5.66 (5.71)
REPMISCMGT =1 if auditors are legally required to report misconduct by freq.: 58.94%
managers / directors to supervisory agency
FINHELD =1 if a widely held ﬁnancial corporation is the controlling shareholder m.: 0.02 (0.06)
STATEHELD =1 if a (foreign or domestic) state is the controlling shareholder m.: 0.36 (0.39)
OTHERHELD =1 if the controlling owner is not widely held, nor stateowned, m.: 0.01 (0.03)
or nor widely held by a ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial corporation
WIDELYHELD =1 if there is no controlling shareholder m.: 0.18 (0.21)
HOLDEME =1 if the ﬁrst holding comes from an emerging market country freq.: 39.84%
HOLDIE =1 if the ﬁrst holding comes from a industrialized country freq.: 16.34%
ECONOPACITY Assessment of “how bankers were concerned that their government would impose m.: 2.29 (0.25)
new or additional controls or restrictions”
LEGALOPACITY Assessment of “the transparency of government policies that regulate businesses” m.: 2.45 (0.31)
JUDSYSEF Assessment of “the eﬃciency and integrity of the legal environment, m.: 6.5 (1.48)
as it aﬀects business particularly foreign ﬁrms”
RULEOFLAW Assessment of “the law and order tradition” m. 5.46 (1.86)
LEGFRENCHSYS =1 if the legal system is based on the french one freq.: 56.98%
Freq.: in sample frequency, m.: mean, standard deviation in brackets.
Source : Bankscope, Barth et al. (2001)), LaPorta et al. (1997), Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Sobaci (2001) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers
Transparency Project 2001.
1
0framework, thus, unlike OLS, providing consistent estimates of the parame-
ters. It is also preferable to 2SLS because it is a full-information estimation
technique which estimates all parameters simultaneously, incorporating the
cross-equation correlation and thus producing asymptotically more eﬃcient
parameter estimates. However, 3SLS may be sensitive to misspeciﬁcation
or measurement error, suggesting comparison of the estimation results from
3SLS with 2SLS as a speciﬁcation check. Here, both techniques produce
essentially the same results.
Table 3: Simultaneous equations system (??) regression results with single
regulatory pressure variable
Estim. Method 2SLS 3SLS
Variables DEQTA DRISK DEQTA DRISK
INTERCEPT 9.1832∗∗∗ 11.8148∗∗∗ 9.1833∗∗∗ 11.8139∗∗∗
(1.1522) (2.3356) (1.1522) (2.3356)
SIZE −0.1482∗∗ −0.5408∗∗∗ −0.1482∗∗ −0.5406∗∗∗









ROAA 0.0021 −0.7855∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.7856∗∗∗
(0.0283) (0.0619) (0.0283) (0.0619)
MINCAR(CC) −4.6366∗∗∗ 0.6571 −4.6367∗∗∗ 0.6556
(0.279) (0.5958) (0.279) (0.5958)
N 1633 1633 1633
F 65.55∗∗∗ 84.75∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.3394 0.4
Sys. weight. R2 0.3762
N : number of observations, F : Fisher Statistic, Adj. R2 : adjusted R2,
Sys. weight. R2 : system weighted R2. Geographical and time dummies not shown.
Table 3 shows the results of 2SLS and 3SLS regressions with control
variables and a single regulatory pressure variable only, the latter being the
11Basel I standard in each country. MINCAR(CC) equals 1 if the bank has a
capital ratio inferior to the national regulatory standard value.
From these results, we remark ﬁrst that both estimation techniques yield
similar results, inducing the use of the most eﬃcient one (3SLS) in the rest of
the study. The model’s statistics are good, with signiﬁcant Fisher statistics,
and with a system weighted R2 for the 3SLS regression close to 0.4.
The SIZE has a signiﬁcantly negative impact on both DEQTA and DRISK.
The variation DRISK has no signiﬁcant impact on DEQTA, while the lag of
the capital ratio (L(EQTA)) has a signiﬁcant and negative impact, suggesting
that capital accumulated in the past makes its progression less important.
We observe a signiﬁcantly negative correlation between DEQTA and DRISK,
suggesting that banks with positive evolution of capital engage into risky ac-
tivities and/or positive evolution in risk contributes to (re)capitalization.
L(RISK) has a negative impact on DRISK, suggesting that past accumula-
tion of credit risk in portfolio stopping the progression of credit risk taking.
The proﬁtability proxy ROAA has no signiﬁcant on DEQTA while having
a signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence on DRISK. The proﬁtability seems to re-
strain credit risk taking activities, as the bank do not have to engage into
more risks in order to generate return. Finally, the impact of the regulatory
pressure is signiﬁcantly negative for the DEQTA, and have no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on DRISK, which is a rather surprising result, but corroborating the
descriptive statistics in table 1. Concerning the latter estimate, it seems that
bank capital regulation may not be the best suited regulatory device to bind
excessive risk taking behavior in emerging markets, as MINCAR(CC) has no
eﬀect on DRISK. As to its eﬀect on capitalization, the negative sign seems
to indicate that when a bank runs into undercapitalization, it is usually“too
late”to react properly (the variables DRISK and ROAA have not signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients).
These ﬁrst results show some surprising empirical evidence, which should
be deepen. Therefore, we turn to the second type of speciﬁcation, follow-
ing Jacques and Nigro (1997), which implies estimating the simultaneous
equations system (9, 10)5.
3.2 Double regulatory pressure variables results
We now turn to the second speciﬁcation following Jacques and Nigro (1997),
equivalent to the system (9, 10). The 2SLS and 3SLS estimation results are
given in the table 4.
5Due to lack of space, we skip the regression’s results including regulatory, institutional
and legal factors for the equations system (7, 8) following Shrieves and Dahl (1992), which
12Table 4: Simultaneous equations system (??) regression results with double
regulatory pressure variable
Estim. Method 2SLS 3SLS
Variables DEQTA DRISK DEQTA DRISK
INTERCEPT 6.1236∗∗∗ 10.2867∗∗∗ 6.1232∗∗∗ 10.3031∗∗∗
(1.084) (2.5467) (1.084) (2.5467)
SIZE −0.1993∗∗∗ −0.3597∗∗ −0.1993∗∗∗ −0.3612∗∗









ROAA 0.0174 −0.6893∗∗∗ 0.0184 −0.6889∗∗∗
(0.0293) (0.0686) (0.0293) (0.0686)
NETINC −2.95E − 7 −5.09E − 6∗∗∗ −2.94E − 7 −5.09E − 6∗∗∗
(6.333E-7) (1.519E-6) (6.333E-7) (1.519E-6)
CARHIGH 116.4035∗∗∗ −12.6588 116.4027∗∗∗ −12.9498
(4.8731) (10.2938) (4.8731) (10.2938)
CARLOW −1.0303 −11.0319∗∗∗ −1.007 −11.0256∗∗∗
(0.8431) (1.9951) (0.8431) (1.9951)
N 1633 1633 1633
F 83.29∗∗∗ 77.59∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.4305 0.413
Sys. weight. R2 0.4273
N : number of observations, F : Fisher Statistic, Adj. R2 : adjusted R2,
Sys. weight. R2 : system weighted R2. Geographical and time dummies not shown.
13Again, we observe similar results for the 2SLS and 3SLS estimation
method, therefore the latter is retained for the rest of the study. Compared
to the results of the ﬁrst speciﬁcation following Shrieves and Dahl (1992),
we observe similar coeﬃcients’ signs and signiﬁcance. The new added vari-
able NETINC behaves in a similar manner as ROAA, with only signiﬁcant
negative sign for the DRISK equation.
The crucial point is the CARHIGH and CARLOW coeﬃcients signs. We
observe signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient for the CARHIGH variable in the
DEQTA equation, and signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcient for the CARLOW
variable in the DRISK equation. Well capitalized banks seem to exhibit a
positive correlation between the evolution of their capital ratios and their
distance to minimum country CAR. This ﬁrst result may be interpreted as a
cautionary behavior, banks aiming at building precautionary excess capital
cushion reserves while being well capitalized - above the minimum CAR.
The second result seems to show an eﬀective impact of this type of bank
regulation, as undercapitalized banks exhibit a negative correlation between
the evolution of their credit risk and their distance to the minimum country
CAR. Such regulation tends to be eﬀective in binding excessive risk taking
behavior in undercapitalized banks in emerging market economies.
In the following subsection we use this speciﬁcation (equations system
(9, 10)) and add several regulatory, institutional and legal factors into the
regressions in order to investigate their impact on the relationship between
capital and risk in banks from emerging market economies.
3.3 Double regulatory pressure variables results in-
cluding environmental factors
Following the existing literature and using stepwise regressions, we isolate
the main environmental factors inﬂuencing the relationship between capital
and risk6.
These ﬁrst results shown in table 5 provide some empirical evidence on
the inﬂuence of some regulatory and market discipline factors on risk and
capital in banks in emerging markets.
Concerning the variables already used and interpreted, we observe that
DRISK is now signiﬁcantly negative as well as ROAA in the DEQTA equa-
tion. CARLOW is now also signiﬁcantly negative, which corroborates the
ﬁndings using the ﬁrst speciﬁcation following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) shown
are available upon request.
6The number of observations may vary depending on data availability for the environ-
mental factors.
14Table 5: Simultaneous equations system (9, 10) regression results with double
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15in table 3. In the DRISK equation, DEQTA becomes signiﬁcantly negative.
As to the environmental factors, we have a signiﬁcant and negative cor-
relation between COVRATIO and DEQTA and DRISK, suggesting that a
higher coverage ratio of the bank deposits requires more funds in the bank,
therefore reducing its capitalization and its risk taking.
The existence of a personal limit in the deposit insurance scheme (PER-
SLIM) have a signiﬁcant and positive impact on DEQTA, suggesting that
such regulatory device generates some form of market discipline from the
depositors (especially the big ones), and this seems to incite the banks to
generate capital - in order to be able to respond to depositors withdrawals
and/or to signal an adequate charter value which may be interpreted by
depositors as a proxy of bank’s strength.
Finally, we observe negative correlation between GOVBKFUND (the de-
posit insurance fund is coﬁnanced by the banks and the government) and
DEQTA and DRISK. This particular type of deposit insurance scheme ﬁ-
nancing seems to inﬂuence negatively the evolution of bank capital, as the
participation of the state reduces the need to signal ﬁnancial strength to mar-
ket, because deposits insurance is coﬁnanced by“free”public funds. However,
the banks’ participation to the fund seems to be disciplining enough on the
risk side, as we observe a signiﬁcantly negative sign in the DRISK equation,
inducing the bank to adopt a rather conservative risk taking behavior in such
environments.
The existence of private credit registries (PRIVCREDREG) implies coun-
terintuitive positive coeﬃcient signs in both equation. A negative sign was
expected for the DRISK equation, as the existence of such registries con-
tributes to the production and sharing of information on clients and the
credit market as well, inducing higher transparency and better market disci-
pline forces. Apparently, such eﬀect may be found on the capital side, as the
variable has the expected sign in the DEQTA equation, and we may inter-
pret it in the same manner as for the PERSLIM variable. This disciplining
eﬀect is missing on the risk side, as we observe a positive sign in the DRISK
equation, suggesting an adverse eﬀect of this type of registries for credit risk
taking behavior. Its information may be incomplete, inadequate or its use
may be underdeveloped in emerging market economies’ banks.
Finally, the obligation of risk management procedures’ public disclosure
(RISKDISCPUB) has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on DRISK. This
counterintuitive result may be interpreted in a similar manner as the PRIV-
CREDREG result. Or these procedures are incomplete and/or inadequate,
therefore having no eﬀect on market discipline eﬃciency, or even if publicly
disclosed, the market participants don’t have the necessary knowledge or
skills to use it, and/or they don’t trust it. Therefore, a bank engaged into
16excessive risk taking will continue even if it discloses its risk management
procedures.
In table 6 we show results of further investigations into other regulatory
and market discipline features impact on capital and risk in banks.
We observe a signiﬁcant and negative correlation between the number of
denied foreign applications for a banking licence (DENAPPFOR) and DE-
QTA and DRISK. Conditional on an eﬃcient“screening”of the banks’ appli-
cations by the authorities, such device reduce market discipline and provides
banks a comfortable and quasi-monopolistic position on the market, gener-
ating great charter value, and therefore permitting to reduce the evolution
of capital and risk.
We also observe a signiﬁcantly negative correlation between DEPINSDEC
(the deposits insurer decides to intervene in a troubled bank) and DEQTA,
and no signiﬁcance for DRISK. Such regulatory device seems to aﬀect capi-
talization without inﬂuencing risk taking behavior.
Environments where legal action against auditors for negligence (LEGAC-
TION) exhibit signiﬁcant and positive correlation with DEQTA and no sig-
niﬁcance for DRISK. Again, such device aﬀects capitalization, but not risk
taking.
As to the legal obligation to report miscmanagement by the auditors to
the regulator (REPMISCMGT), we observe signiﬁcant and positive signs for
both equation DEQTA and DRISK. This result is counterintuitive, as such
regulatory device should bind risk taking behavior, because if excess risk (due
to miscmanagement) is discovered by the auditors, it will be reported to the
regulator which will intervene into the bank. Including this variable with
LEGACTION allows us to control both for the disciplining of the auditors
by the regulator and the legal environment, and for the disciplining of the
banks by the auditors. Obviously, such regulatory features generate adverse
eﬀects in emerging markets, probably because of lack of eﬃcient and strong
legal environment, problems of collusion between the auditor and the bank,
corruption, or lack of usefulness of auditor’s report for the regulator, the
latter being unable or unqualiﬁed to make eﬃcient use of it for his supervisory
purposes.
Results shown in table 7 allows us to investigate the impact of some
corporate governance features, mainly ownership structure and nationality,
on the relationship between capital and risk in banks.
Except the DRISK in DEQTA equation and DEQTA in DRISK equation,
all the coeﬃcients of the standard variables remain the same.
Concerning the environmental factors, we observe ﬁrst that the national-
ity of the ﬁrst holding doesn’t seem to matter, as both coeﬃcients (HOLDEME
and HOLDIE) are positively correlated with DRISK. Concerning the coun-
17Table 6: Simultaneous equations system (9, 10) regression results with double
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18Table 7: Simultaneous equations system (9, 10) regression results with dou-
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19try’s banks ownership structure, a bank having a ﬁnancial institution as a
controlling shareholder (FINHELD) will exhibit respectively negative and
positive correlation with DEQTA and DRISK. Such shareholder may serve
as a capital provider in an environment with lack of other sources of fresh
capital injection due to ﬁnancial markets underdevelopment, and therefore
we observe a negative coeﬃcient sign in the DEQTA equation. On the con-
trary, such shareholder may incite the bank to engage into excessive risk
taking activities.
When the state is a controlling shareholder (STATEHELD), we observe
the same behavior on the capital side : public assistance in case of trou-
bles seems to be anticipated, with a negative coeﬃcient sign in the DEQTA
equation.
Dispersed shareholders (WIDELYHELD) seem to implement some kind
of discipline, as we observe negative and signiﬁcant signs in both DEQTA
and DRISK equations.
Finally, the only ownership structure implementing a“perfect”discipline,
with a positive sign on the capital side and a negative one on the risk side,
is the OTHERHELD shareholders type, which seems to be a family type of
ownership structure (such type of ownership structure remains still important
in emerging market economies).
Finally, the results shown in table 8 provide some insight into the inﬂu-
ence of economic and legal opacity, as well as rule of law and legislation, on
capital and risk in banks. The ﬁrst two variables - ECONOPACITY and
LEGALOPACITY - are outputs from a survey done by PWC which aim was
to evaluate the level of opacity perceived by bankers. We observe a signif-
icant and positive coeﬃcient sign for ECONOPACITY in DRISK equation
and for LEGALOPACITY in DEQTA equation. The economic opacity seems
to be positively related to credit risk taking and legal opacity to capitaliza-
tion. The ﬁrst result suggests that a higher level of perceived economic and
business environment opacity favors excessive credit risk taking in banks, as
higher transparency would alleviate adverse incentives. Additional restric-
tions and controls imposed by the authorities tend to“secure”such excessive
risk taking behavior. The second result suggests that legal opacity which
drives policies dealing with business environment favors bank capitalization,
as in such an opaque environment banks should hold a cushion of capital in
case of adverse evolution of the legislation.
The last three variables deal exclusively with legal enforcement and ju-
dical environment. The RULEOFLAW index appears signiﬁcantly negative
only in the DRISK equation, as credit risk taking should be negatively related
to higher levels of rule of law.
The JUDSYSEF index appears to be signiﬁcantly positive in the DE-
20Table 8: Simultaneous equations system (9, 10) regression results with double


































Sys. weight. R2 0.5575
N : number of observations, Sys. weight. : system weighted.
Geographical and time dummies not shown.
21QTA equation and negative in the DRISK equation. The latter result may
be interpreted as in the RULEOFLAW case - a more eﬃcient judical sys-
tem restrains excessive risk taking incentives. The former result seems less
intuitive. It may be interpreted in the following manner : in a more eﬃ-
cient judical environment, bankers may need to hold excess capital cushion
in order to meet regulatory requirement and also to signal ﬁnancial strength,
showing abilities to meet potential economic or legal problems.
Finally, the french origin of the legal system (LEGFRENCHSYS) is neg-
atively correlated to both DEQTA and DRISK, as such a system is mainly
a Civil Law system, thus giving a better protection of state’s interests and
not private and individual debtholders, therefore increasing their market dis-
ciplining power.
4 Conclusion and future research perspectives
The objective of this paper was twofold. The ﬁrst aim was to investigate
the relationship between capital and credit risk in banks from emerging mar-
kets, using methodologies following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Jacques
and Nigro (1997). Empirical evidence on this issue shouldn’t be neglected,
as these markets are gaining importance each day, and healthy banking in-
dustries remain a core elements of their economic prosperity. The second aim
was to investigate the inﬂuence of regulatory, institutional and legal factors
on this relationship between capital and risk. This topic didn’t receive much
attention, but it remains crucial to understand the role of this regulatory and
legal environment in driving bank capitalization and risk taking behavior, es-
pecially in emerging market economies, where building such an environment
is still an ongoing process.
Our results corroborateempirical ﬁndings from other studies (e.g. Shrieves
and Dahl 1992, Jacques and Nigro 1997, VanRoy 2003), proving the impor-
tance of bank capital regulation for healthy banking industry in emerging
market economies. We also prove the role of the regulatory, institutional
and legal environment in driving bank capitalization and credit risk taking
behavior.
This study proposes a ﬁrst sketch of investigation of these issues. More en-
vironmental factors should be investigated, in order to put forward the crucial
ones at driving bankers behavior in emerging market economies. Compar-
isons with industrial economies could also shed some light on the relationship
between capital and risk, and the role of environmental factors in it. Finally,
more precise econometric investigation of non linearities, as well as causality,
in the relationship between risk and capital are further research perspectives.
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